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Complexity.Crypto.Computational.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters

GSW parameters with a logarithmic-depth noise margin #

For t = 1 + clog 2 (λ + 2), choose digit width w = 16384 * t^2, ciphertext dimension N = (n + 1) * w, sample count m = N + 2λ, and depth budget L = 512 * t. The secret and positive-noise dimensions reuse Parameters.dimension and Parameters.noise, both λ + 1. The complete margin 4 * m * η * (N + 1)^L < 2^w holds at every security parameter.

All dimensions and the budget have uniform unary native routines. The modulus has a binary routine; its value is not claimed polynomially bounded. Security assumes decision LWE for exactly this family's centered-binomial law. These numerical bounds do not establish that an actual augmented decryption circuit fits the budget, or assert lattice hardness or circular security.

Main definitions #

Main results #

References #

The constants here supply explicit compatible inequalities for the power-of-two specialization; they are not a claim about the paper's hardness parameters.

A positive logarithmic size, at least two even at security parameter zero.

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    Binary digits in each modular coordinate.

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      Ciphertext rows and columns.

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        Public samples and independent source bits in each encryption row.

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          Number of NAND levels covered by the proved noise margin.

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            Modulus, represented in binary by the native routine below.

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              The logarithmic size is uniformly bounded away from zero.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.logSize_le (security : ℕ) :
              logSize security ≤ security + 2

              A simple linear majorant for the logarithmic size.

              Every parameter has a nonempty modular word.

              The depth budget is positive for every security parameter.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.entropy_margin (security : ℕ) :
              rows security + 2 * security ≤ samples security

              The number of samples has exactly the required entropy surplus.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.width_le (security : ℕ) :
              width security ≤ 16384 * (security + 2) ^ 2

              The binary digit width has an explicit quadratic majorant.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.rows_le (security : ℕ) :
              rows security ≤ 16384 * (security + 2) ^ 3

              The ciphertext dimension has an explicit cubic majorant.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.samples_le (security : ℕ) :
              samples security ≤ 16386 * (security + 2) ^ 3

              The public sample count has an explicit cubic majorant.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.depthBudget_le (security : ℕ) :
              depthBudget security ≤ 512 * (security + 2)

              The logarithmic budget also has a linear majorant.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.noise_margin (security : ℕ) :
              4 * samples security * Parameters.noise security * (rows security + 1) ^ depthBudget security < modulus security

              The complete declared NAND depth remains strictly inside the original decoding margin.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.noise_margin_of_le {security depth : ℕ} (hdepth : depth ≤ depthBudget security) :
              4 * samples security * Parameters.noise security * (rows security + 1) ^ depth < modulus security

              Every smaller depth also satisfies the full noise margin.

              Fresh ciphertexts satisfy the strict decoding margin.

              theorem Cslib.Crypto.Homomorphic.GSW.DepthParameters.nand_margin (security : ℕ) :
              4 * ((1 + rows security) * (samples security * Parameters.noise security)) < modulus security

              A NAND of two fresh ciphertexts satisfies the existing sampler theorem's margin.

              The actual shared-public-matrix error bound is negligible for this new family.