GSW parameters with a logarithmic-depth noise margin #
For t = 1 + clog 2 (λ + 2), choose digit width w = 16384 * t^2, ciphertext dimension
N = (n + 1) * w, sample count m = N + 2λ, and depth budget L = 512 * t. The secret and
positive-noise dimensions reuse Parameters.dimension and Parameters.noise, both λ + 1.
The complete margin 4 * m * η * (N + 1)^L < 2^w holds at every security parameter.
All dimensions and the budget have uniform unary native routines. The modulus has a binary routine; its value is not claimed polynomially bounded. Security assumes decision LWE for exactly this family's centered-binomial law. These numerical bounds do not establish that an actual augmented decryption circuit fits the budget, or assert lattice hardness or circular security.
Main definitions #
Main results #
noise_margin: the strict decoding margin after the entire declared depth budget.entropy_margin,negligible_statistical_error: the statistical part of the security bound.polynomiallyBounded_parameters: polynomial bounds for the unary numerical parameters.computableTidilyInPolyTime_modulus: native computation of the binary modulus.
References #
The constants here supply explicit compatible inequalities for the power-of-two specialization; they are not a claim about the paper's hardness parameters.
A positive logarithmic size, at least two even at security parameter zero.
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Binary digits in each modular coordinate.
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Ciphertext rows and columns.
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Public samples and independent source bits in each encryption row.
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Number of NAND levels covered by the proved noise margin.
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Modulus, represented in binary by the native routine below.
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The logarithmic size is uniformly bounded away from zero.
Every parameter has a nonempty modular word.
The depth budget is positive for every security parameter.
The logarithmic budget also has a linear majorant.
The complete declared NAND depth remains strictly inside the original decoding margin.
Every smaller depth also satisfies the full noise margin.
Fresh ciphertexts satisfy the strict decoding margin.
The logarithmic size is uniformly computable with unary input and output.
Compute the unary digit width, including its quadratic dependence on the logarithm.
Compute the unary ciphertext dimension.
Compute the unary public sample count.
Compute the unary logarithmic depth budget.
Compute the modulus in binary; this does not assert efficient unary output.
All unary parameters have polynomial bounds; the modulus is deliberately excluded.
The actual shared-public-matrix error bound is negligible for this new family.